Federal agency AI use cases are rapidly transforming how government teams manage governance, risk, and compliance. From automating evidence collection to identifying risks earlier, AI is helping agencies improve visibility and support continuous compliance.</p>
Most writing about AI in federal compliance describes what the technology could do. This article describes what agencies have already done, because that record is public.
Federal agencies are required to publish inventories of their AI use cases. The 2025 Federal Agency AI Use Case Inventory, published by the Office of Management and Budget with the repository last updated on April 14th, 2026, documents 3,611 individual use cases across 56 submitting agencies. That is an increase of 105 percent over the 1,757 use cases reported in 2024.
Within that record, five categories of deployment are visible in governance, risk and compliance work. Each is described below with reference to systems that agencies have themselves published as deployed.
A note on what the inventory does not cover
Intelligence Community and Department of War use cases are exempt from this reporting requirement, and other agencies may withhold national security use cases.
The inventory therefore describes civilian federal adoption. It understates total government use, and it should not be read as a complete picture of defense activity.
1. Security Operations and Anomaly Detection
This is the most mature category, and the one where AI has been operating longest. It is also the category where the output feeds directly into control evidence, which is what makes it a governance matter rather than purely a security one.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) publishes a small, well-documented inventory. Two entries are directly relevant. Security Operation Center Network Anomaly Detection supports analysts hunting and detecting malicious activity on federal civilian agency networks. Confidence Scoring for Cybersecurity Threat Indicators applies an AI-driven decision process to assign a confidence score to submissions, with analysts accessing the output through an interactive dashboard alongside rule-based heuristics.
Two design characteristics are worth noting, because they recur across the better examples in the inventory. The first is that the AI produces a score or an alert rather than a conclusion, and an analyst interprets it. The second is that CISA consolidated several previously separate threat hunting entries into a single use case on the basis of similar AI use and similar governance considerations, which indicates that the inventory is being actively managed rather than simply filed.
The compliance relevance is direct. Continuous monitoring obligations under FISMA depend on detection capability, and detection output is control evidence. An agency that improves detection improves the evidence base its authorization rests on.
2. Automated Review of Compliance Documents
The second category addresses the largest manual cost in most compliance functions: reading documents to find problems in them.
The Department of Labor's published inventory includes a grants monitoring capability that automates review of grant documents to identify anomalies, delays and compliance issues, with the stated benefit of saving time during site visits and improving monitoring accuracy. The same inventory records a capability applying a neural network to extract findings from single audit reports submitted by grant recipients.
Both examples share a structure. A large volume of unstructured documents arrives on a recurring cycle. A requirement exists to identify specific conditions within them. The volume exceeds what reviewers can examine closely, so sampling is used instead. AI changes the economics of that trade-off by allowing a first pass across the full population, with reviewers directed to the items that warrant attention.
This is the pattern most transferable to other compliance functions. Supplier attestations, subcontractor flow-down documentation, incident reports, system security documentation and audit responses all have the same shape.
The condition attached is that the output must cite the source. A finding that identifies a document, a page and a passage can be verified. A summary without provenance cannot be used as evidence, which is a point covered in more detail in our article on moving from manual evidence collection to continuous compliance.
3. Records Classification and Retention Compliance
The third category is less visible than security work and carries real regulatory weight.
The Department of Labor's inventory records an electronic records management capability that applies AI and natural language processing to identify metadata, classify and summarize federal records in compliance with National Archives and Records Administration standards.
Records management is a compliance obligation that most agencies meet through manual classification at the point of creation, which is the point at which staff attention is least available. Misclassification is quiet, accumulates, and surfaces during a records request or an audit rather than during normal operations.
For agencies handling Controlled Unclassified Information, this category connects to a problem raised repeatedly across federal cybersecurity policy: inconsistent and improper marking of sensitive information. Marking determines handling, handling determines control scope, and control scope determines cost. Automated classification support addresses the problem at its source rather than downstream.
4. Privacy and Sensitive Data Discovery
The fourth category is narrow, specific, and maps to a defined control family.
CISA's inventory includes automated detection of personally identifiable information within cybersecurity data. The requirement arises because threat data shared for defensive purposes may contain personal information that was never intended to be shared, and reviewing that data manually at volume is not practical.
This is a useful example for a GRC audience because the control objective is unambiguous. There is a defined category of data, a defined obligation not to propagate it, and a volume problem that makes manual review ineffective. Those three conditions together describe where automated detection earns its place.
The same structure applies to discovery of sensitive information across file shares, collaboration platforms and email, which is a common gap in control implementation and a frequent finding in assessments.
5. Governed Internal Knowledge Retrieval
The fifth category is the most widely deployed and the most frequently underestimated.
Several agencies have deployed internal generative AI assistants within controlled environments. CISA operates a custom generative AI solution allowing authorized personnel to interact with, summarize and search agency-created materials and internal content. The General Services Administration has developed an internal AI platform with a chatbot, application programming interface integrations and an administrative console, intended to enable secure and compliant AI use tailored to agency needs. The Department of Labor's inventory includes both a private in-house generative AI assistant supporting summarization, semantic search and document comparison, and a capability for answering federal regulatory and agency policy questions related to acquisition.
That last example is the clearest compliance application in the inventory. A specialist answering a regulatory question currently searches policy libraries, framework text and prior determinations, and the quality of the answer depends on whether the specialist knows where to look. Retrieval across an authoritative corpus changes who can answer the question and how long it takes.
Three conditions separate a useful deployment from a liability. The corpus must be restricted to authoritative sources. Responses must return citations the user can open. Access must respect existing information boundaries, so that the assistant does not become a route around permissions that were deliberately set.
[MOFU — Consideration. What the pattern across the five actually shows.]
What the Pattern Across All Five Shows
Read together, the five categories support three observations that matter more than any individual deployment.
Deployment is concentrated where the output is checkable. Every category above produces something a qualified person can verify: a score an analyst reviews, a flagged document a reviewer opens, a classification a records officer confirms, a detection a privacy officer examines, a cited answer a specialist checks. The deployments that have reached production are the ones where verification is practical.
The classification exercise is now part of the work. Of the 3,611 reported use cases, 445 were deemed high-impact. Agencies are not only deploying these systems, they are formally assessing and recording their impact, and that record is public. The classification carries its own obligations, which we cover separately in our article on the role of AI in GRC and the governance requirements it creates.
Adoption is uneven and visible. The Department of Health and Human Services reported the most use cases at 447, followed by NASA at 425, the Department of Veterans Affairs at 367, the Department of Energy at 340, and the Department of Justice at 314. The Department of Veterans Affairs reported the most high-impact cases at 215. Because the inventory is public, an agency can see where peers have gone and what they classified.
The practical use of this record
An agency planning an AI deployment in a compliance function can search the published inventory for comparable use cases at peer agencies, see the stated purpose, see the deployment status, and see whether the agency classified it as high-impact.
That is a faster and more defensible starting point than a vendor capability deck, and it is free.
What is not in the inventory
Two absences are as instructive as the entries themselves.
First, there is little evidence of AI being used to make compliance determinations. The deployed systems score, flag, classify, summarize and retrieve. They do not decide whether a control is satisfied or accept a risk. That boundary appears to be holding in practice, and it is the correct boundary, for reasons we set out in our discussion of advisory and decisional AI design.
Second, the inventory records capability rather than outcome. It states what a system does and whether it is deployed. It does not report whether the deployment improved accuracy, reduced cost or strengthened the control environment. An agency evaluating a comparable deployment should expect to define its own measures, because the inventory will not supply them.
[BOFU — Conversion. KSG as subject. Capability, not pitch.]
How KSG Approaches This Work
Kaizen Solutions Group has secured federal and state government systems since 2016. We are an SBA 8(a)-certified small disadvantaged business, ISO 27001:2022, ISO 9001:2015 and ISO 20000-1:2018 certified, and we hold GSA HACS designations across all five categories: Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, High Value Asset assessment, Penetration Testing, Incident Response, and Cyber Hunt.
We do not treat AI as a standalone tool. We integrate AI into governed business and security processes with access control, auditability and risk management already in place, so that an agency gains the operational benefit without weakening its security posture or its compliance position.
The pattern in the inventory matches how we scope this work. The deployments that succeed are narrow, attached to a defined control objective, and designed so that a qualified person verifies the output. The ones that struggle are broad, attached to a general ambition to reduce effort, and designed so that nobody is quite accountable for what the system produced.
Where we typically begin
AI for Governance, Risk and Compliance — We apply AI to control mapping, evidence summarization, gap identification and draft narrative generation, with citation to source artifacts and an accountable reviewer at every determination point.
AI governance and responsible AI — We support AI use case inventory development, impact classification, pre-deployment testing and ongoing monitoring aligned to the NIST AI Risk Management Framework and OMB direction.
Secure knowledge management — We build retrieval over authoritative sources with citation, permission inheritance and audit logging, so that an assistant does not become a route around access controls.
Governance, Continuous ATO and Continuous Monitoring — We establish the control baselines, evidence sources and monitoring cadence that any of these deployments depend on, including FISMA program support and Assessment and Authorization services.
Security operations and engineering — We support Security Operations Center monitoring, SIEM and SOAR, Identity and Access Management, endpoint detection and response, and DevSecOps, which are the systems that generate control evidence in the first place.
Risk Management and POA&M analytics — We deliver continuous monitoring, vulnerability and patch management, and Key Risk Indicator and Key Performance Indicator dashboards in Tableau and Power BI.
A useful place to begin
Before selecting a capability, an agency benefits from answering two questions. Which compliance tasks currently consume reviewer time without producing judgment, and which of those produce an output a qualified person could verify quickly?
Those two answers identify the deployments most likely to succeed, and they match the pattern visible across the agencies that have already deployed.
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Frequently Asked Questions
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What is the Federal Agency AI Use Case Inventory?
It is a public record of AI use cases across federal agencies, reported to the Office of Management and Budget under statutory and executive direction including the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act and OMB Memorandum M-25-21. The 2025 inventory was published with the repository last updated on April 14th, 2026. Agencies also publish their own inventory pages, which often carry more detail on individual use cases than the consolidated file.
How many AI use cases do federal agencies report?
The 2025 inventory documents 3,611 use cases across 56 submitting agencies, an increase of 105 percent over the 1,757 reported in 2024. The Department of Health and Human Services reported the most at 447, followed by NASA at 425, the Department of Veterans Affairs at 367, the Department of Energy at 340, and the Department of Justice at 314.
Are Department of War AI use cases included?
No. Intelligence Community and Department of War use cases are exempt from this reporting requirement, and other agencies may withhold national security use cases. The inventory describes civilian federal adoption and understates total government use.
How many use cases are classified as high-impact?
445 of the 3,611 reported use cases were deemed high-impact. The Department of Veterans Affairs reported the most, at 215. High-impact classification under OMB M-25-21 triggers minimum risk management practices including pre-deployment testing, an AI impact assessment, ongoing monitoring and human oversight.
Are federal agencies using AI to make compliance decisions?
The published inventories show very little of this. Deployed systems score, flag, classify, summarize and retrieve. Determinations about whether a control is satisfied, and decisions to accept risk, remain with accountable officials. That boundary is both what the record shows and what sound design requires, because an AI output that serves as the principal basis for a consequential decision changes how the system must be governed.
What is the most common AI application in federal compliance work?
Across published inventories, document review at volume and governed internal retrieval are the most widely represented. Both address the same underlying problem: a reviewer population too small for the document population, and a requirement to find specific conditions within it.
How can an agency use the inventory for planning?
Search it for comparable use cases at peer agencies, then examine the stated purpose, the deployment status and the impact classification. It establishes what has already been attempted, by whom, and how those agencies assessed the risk. It will not report whether the deployment succeeded, because the inventory records capability rather than outcome.